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Abstract: The Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack is an attack on cryptographic devices, especially 
smart cards. The results of the attack are correlation traces. Based on the correlation traces, an evaluation is 
done to observe whether significant peaks appear in the traces or not. The evaluation is done manually, by 
experts. If significant peaks appear then the smart card is not considered secure since it is assumed that the 
secret key is revealed. We develop a method that objectively detects peaks and decides which peak is 
significant. We conclude that using the Gaussian curve fitting method, the subjective qualification of the peak 
significance can be objectified. Thus, better decisions can be taken by security experts. We also conclude that the Gaussian 
curve fitting method is able to show the influence of peak sizes, especially the width and height, to a significance of a 
particular peak. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cryptographic devices [1] are electronic devices 
that implement a cryptographic algorithm and that 
store keys. An example of a cryptographic device is a 
smart card. A smart card is a device that has the same 
size as a credit card. It is able to store data and to 
process data by using an integrated chip. To process 
data, the chip performs a cryptographic algorithm that 
employs a secret key. Any attempt to extract the keys 
stored in the cryptographic device in an unauthorized 
way is called an attack. One class of attacks that poses 
serious threat to the security of cryptographic devices 
are the side-channel attacks. A side-channel attack is 
an attack applying information gained from the 
physical implementation of a cryptographic device, 
for example timing information, power consumption, 
and electromagnetic leaks. 
One type of side-channel attacks is Correlation 
Power analysis (CPA) attacks. This type of attack is a 
refinement of another type of side channel attacks 
called Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack, that 
was first introduced in 1999 in [2]. The CPA attack, 
which was introduced [3] in 2004, is a multi-bit DPA 
taking into account the linear relationship between the 
power consumption curve and the Hamming model. 
In general, this attack exploits the fact that the power 
consumption of a cryptographic device depends on 
the data it processes and the operation it performs [1]. 
By conducting this attack, an attacker may obtain the 
secret keys used in the cryptographic algorithm 
employed by the device.  
In this paper, we focus on the CPA attack on 
smart cards. CPA is relatively easy to be carried out 
and has a high success rate. It is not necessary for the 
attacker to have detailed knowledge about the smart 
cards. It is sufficient to know the steps of the 
cryptographic algorithm that is executed by the smart 
cards. That is why a lot of research is done to improve 
the security of smart cards against this attack. 
The result of the CPA attack is represented by 
correlation traces [3]. Based on the correlation traces, 
an evaluation is done to observe whether significant 
peaks appear in the traces or not. If significant peaks 
appear then the smart card is not considered secure 
since it is assumed that the secret key is revealed. If 
there are no significant peaks, the smart card is secure. 
The higher and steeper the peaks, the stronger the 
attack and the less secure the smart card is. 
The difficulty is to objectively decide whether a 
peak is significant enough to be called a peak. To 
support the decision making process, we develop a 
method to detect peaks and to decide which peak is 
significant.  
 
THE CPA ATTACK 
 
The CPA attack is based on two important 
concepts, i.e., leakage function and bit/byte trace.  
A leakage function [4] is an abstraction used to 
represent the physical output of a side-channel, 
monitored by some measurement setup. The input of 
a leakage function is a plaintext that will be processed 
by a cryptographic device. In the CPA attack, the 
output of this leakage function is the power con-
sumption of the cryptographic device sampled with a 
fixed sampling frequency while processing the input 
plaintext. In this project, the output of the leakage 
function is called a power trace. 
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Practically, a power trace from a smart card is 
obtained by measuring the power consumption of the 
smart card while processing a binary input. The power 
trace is not the end result of the process, but the 
intermediate result. For example, if a smart card 
employs some cryptographic algorithm with several 
rounds where each round uses one specific secret key, 
the power trace is taken after one round is finished. A 
byte trace [1] is an approach to monitor a predictable 
byte during the course of the process. In the context of 
a power analysis, the byte trace approach is applied to 
check leakage of some cryptographic device. The 
result of the byte trace approach is a correlation 
coefficient between the input and the power trace at 
one time. All the resulted correlation coefficient is 
called correlation traces. 
The investigation to check whether the smart 
card is leaking is done based on the correlation trace 
plot (see Figure 1). If there is a high peak on the plot, 
it means that the investigated byte has a high 
correlation with the power consumption at the time 
point at which this high peak appears. This fact 
already shows that there is some information leaking 
from the smart card. 
 
  
 
Figure 1: The plot of correlation coefficient between the 
input and the power trace. 
 
More detailed explanation about the steps of the 
CPA attack can be found in [1]. 
 
RELATED WORKS 
 
[5] discusses methods to evaluate and compare 
side-channel attacks. Some simple numerical exam-
ples of leakage function and some illustration how the 
functions could be evaluated and understood are given 
in [6]. The methods are based on two metrics: 
information theoretic and security metric. However, 
these two metrics cannot be used to solve our problem 
since the metrics need a lot of power traces, where 
each is obtained using different sets of input 
plaintexts. The more power traces are provided, the 
more accurate the results are. The fact is, power trace 
measurements are very expensive. Thus, carrying a lot 
of measurements to get results for one smart card is 
not practical for companies. 
A method to detect peaks is also discussed in [7] 
by using short-time FFT. The method also includes 
noise removal techniques. The method is developed 
for MALDI data, which has different behavior from 
our data. 
[8] and [9] introduces peak detection methods 
using wavelet transformation. The methods consider 
some characteristic shapes to identify peaks. Howe-
ver, the characteristic shapes introduced in this paper 
cannot be adapted in our problem.  
A method to quantify peak is discussed in [10]. 
The method is developed for mass spectrum related to 
protein mixtures. The mass spectrum contains peaks 
corresponding to proteins in a sample. A statistical 
mixture model is developed to quantify peaks. 
However, the quantification mostly depends on peak 
height.  
 
THE SIGNIFICANT PEAK DETECTION 
APPROACH 
 
Our approach to determine whether a peak is 
significant or not consists of two main methods. We 
first develop a method to assign a score to each peak 
found in a correlation trace. This method is based on 
the Gaussian curve fitting method. Second, based on 
the resulted peak scores, we determine whether a peak 
is significant or not using the Absolute Score Distance 
computation and the clustering analysis. 
 
The Gaussian Curve Fitting Method 
 
We develop a method based on the Gaussian 
curve fitting method to give a score to each peak 
found in a correlation trace. 
Since the correlation traces typically have too 
many sample points, we downsample it first. The 
resulted downsampled correlation trace is put in a 
vector called local_maxima. The main idea of this 
approach is to fit a curve to the local_maxima vector 
of each correlation trace and qualify each peak found 
in the new curve. We choose a sum of several 
Gaussian functions to fit our correlation trace local 
maxima. The Gaussian function is formulated as 
follows:  
f(x) = 
2
)
2
(
c
bx
ea


   (1) 
with a is the height of the curve, b is the center of the 
curve, and c is the width of the curve. 
Since the values of a and b can be obtained from 
the correlation trace, we only have to estimate c 
before we can apply the curve fitting function. 
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Suppose that we have a set of points {(x1, y1), … 
(xn, yn)} that we want to fit to a curve. Consider 
Equation 1, suppose that a=y
t
 and b=x
m
. The value of 
c is estimated by using the following steps:  
1. Compute c
i
 for each (xi, yi) with given a and b 
using the following formula which is based on 
Equation 1.  
c(i) = 
)
)(
log(
|)(|
a
iy
bix


 (2) 
2. Take the mean and the standard deviation of c
i
, 
denoted by c  and S, respectively.  
3. Form a vector V1 that contains all values of c
i
 that 
are less or equal than c . Take the mean of V1 and 
denote it with  v1    
4. Form a vector V2 that contains all values of c
i
 that 
are less or equal than c + S. Take the mean of V2 
and denote it with  v2    
5. Set the value c as  
c = 
2
21 vv    (3) 
After we get c, we are ready to apply the 
Gaussian Curve Fitting to our correlation traces. The 
general algorithm we use to apply the method is given 
below. 
The input of the algorithm are X, which is a 
correlation trace with X(i) is the correlation coefficient 
for sample i, and window_size, the size of the sliding 
window. The output are the peak location, the peak 
height, the peak area, the peak inverse width, the 
scores of all peaks found, and the normalized scores 
of all peaks found. The steps of the algorithm are as 
follows:  
1. Apply the sliding window of size window_size to 
the absolute value of the correlation trace X and 
find the global maximum of all values within the 
window. Slide the window without overlapping 
and repeat the same operation until the window 
reaches the last sample. Form a vector local_ 
maxima that contains the resulted global maxi-
mum. By performing this process, we replace all 
values within a window with the global maximum 
of values within the window. The global maxi-
mum is chosen to represent values within one 
window because we are interested in significant 
peaks.  
2. Determine shorter length vectors from the vector 
local_maxima such that each smaller vector 
consists of at least one maximum and minimum 
values. Each smaller vector belongs to one 
Gaussian curve fitting function and should contain 
at least three members. The shorter length vectors 
are forms by using the following steps:  
(a) Suppose that local_maxima = {l1, l2,…,lq}  
with l
i
 the ith member of the local_maxima 
vector and q the length of local_maxima. 
Suppose that we start from l
r
 with l
r−1≤lr. 
Form the uth shorter length vector SVu = {lr-1, 
lr}.  
(b) If l
r+1
≤l
r
 and l
r+1
<l
r+2
, set SVu = {lr-1, 
lr,…,lr+1} and stop forming SVu. Otherwise, 
repeat this step for {lr+2, lq} until the condition 
holds.  
(c) Form SVu+1 = {lw-1, lw,} with lw−1 is the last 
member of SV
u
. Go to Step (b) for checking 
the condition for l
w+1
.  
See Figure 2.  
3. Determine the value of a and b for each shorter 
length vector, see Equation 1.  
4. Estimate the value of c for each shorter length 
vector, see Equation 3, by using the steps 
explained previously.  
5. Determine the peak location for each shorter 
length vector. Since the position of the peak need 
not to be a sample point, we increase the 
resolution with a factor 10.  
6. Obtain the peak properties, i.e., peak height and 
inverse width, from the value of a and 
c
1
, 
respectively.  
7. Compute the area below each Gaussian function 
to get the peak area. Suppose that {lv, lv+1,…,lv+m} 
is a shorter length vector that belongs to one 
Gaussian function. The area A is computed as:  
A = dxea
mv
v
l
l
c
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8. Since the peak properties found have different 
scale values, rescale each peak property so that the 
values are between 0 and 1. This can be done 
using the following way. Suppose Yp = {y1,p, y2,p, 
…,ym,p} is a set of peak property values with m the 
number of peaks found, p is referring to a peak 
property, and i is referring to the ith peak found, 
rescaled_yi,p is computed as rescaled_yi,p = 
)max(
,
p
pi
Y
y
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9. Suppose p
1
, p
2
, and p
3
 are the three peak 
properties defined previously, namely the peak 
height, the peak area, and the peak inverse width. 
Also suppose that S={s1, s2,…,sm} is a set peak 
scores with m the number of peaks found and i is 
referring to the ith peak. Compute the peak score 
s
i
 by using the following formula:  
 si = rescaled_yi,p1 . rescaled_yi,p2 .  
     rescaled_yi,p3 .   (6) 
 
The scores obtained are between 0 and 1.  
10. Compute the normalized peak score norm_s
i
 for 
the ith peak found as  
norm_si = 


m
j
j
i
s
s
1
 (7) 
 
Figure 2: The plot of the local maxima and the shorter 
length vector division. 
 
Figure 3 gives an example of the local maxima 
plot of a correlation trace along with the curve fitted to 
it.  
  
Figure 3: The plot of the local maxima and a curve fitted to 
it 
To maintain the stability of the resulted scores 
that can reduce because of the data down sampling, 
we employ four different window sizes to get the 
scores. We start the score calculation from the highest 
window size to the lowest. Therefore, the result from 
this method is a matrix with each row consist of a set 
of four scores (each score obtained by applying one 
window size) for each peak found in the correlation 
trace. 
 
The Peak Score Evaluation 
 
After we obtain scores for all peaks found in a 
correlation trace, we would like to investigate whether 
the peak obtaining the highest score is a significant 
peak or not. We develop two methods to check 
properties of the highest score peak when it is 
compared with other peaks. The decision whether a 
peak is significant or not is made based on the results 
given by all three methods. Thus, the methods do not 
work independently. The methods are explained 
below. 
 
Average score distance 
 
One characteristic of a peak to be a significant 
peak is that the peak score should be a lot greater then 
those of the other peaks. Therefore, we compute the 
average score distance between the highest peak score 
with other peak scores in one correlation trace. The 
computation is done as follows. 
Suppose that Si = {si,1, si,2, si,3, si,4} is a 
multivariate score of the ith peak after window1, 
window2, window3, and window4 are applied, 
respectively. The average score distance is computed 
by the following steps:  
1. Compute the Euclidean distance di,j of every Si
 
and Sj with i ≠j and i,j {1,…,m} as 
      di,j = 
2
1
4
1
2
,, )( 






k
kjki ss  (8) (8) 
2. Compute the average Euclidean distance avdist
i
 of 
the ith peak and all other peak by using the 
following formula  
 avdisti = 
1
1
,



m
d
m
k
ki
 (9) 
3. Compute the average score distance D as  
 D = 
)max(
)max(
absscore
avdist
 (10) 
 
Cluster analysis 
 
We consider that cluster analysis is useful to 
show that a peak is significant or not. If a peak is 
significant, then we assume the peak score is really 
different with the rest of the scores. By applying a 
cluster analysis, we would like to show that if a peak 
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is significant then its score becomes a unique member 
of a cluster, while the other scores are clustered in one 
different cluster. 
In practice, we use cluster analysis on the multi-
variate peak scores obtained, to form two clusters of 
peak scores within one correlation trace. The peak 
score clustering is done using the Statgraphics 
Centurion software. At the moment we use Ward’s 
method (see [11]) in clustering the peak scores, with 
Euclidean distance as a method to compute the 
distance between two peak scores. Other clustering 
method may also be used without significant result 
differences. If the highest peak score is a unique 
member of a cluster, then the possibility that the 
highest peak score is significant becomes more likely. 
We consider that a significant peak should have 
a score of at least 0.50. The score of 0.50 is taken 
based on the idea of probability theory. A probability 
of 0.50 means there is an equal chance that an event to 
happen or not. We perform more analysis to the 
clustering analysis results using the following steps:  
1. Consider the cluster containing the highest score 
peak  
2. If the cluster has one member and the score of the 
member is higher than 0.50, then the member is a 
significant peak.  
3. If the cluster has more than one members, check 
the scores of all members. If all members’ scores 
are higher than 0.50, then the highest score peak is 
a significant peak. If not, then the highest score 
peak is not significant.  
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
We were provided with three data sets by 
Brightsight B.V., a security evaluator laboratory 
located in Delft, the Netherlands. The data sets were 
sampled from a smart card, with a sampling fre-
quency of 500 MHz, while processing input plain-
texts. The operation used in the process is a 16 rounds 
of an XOR operation defined as c = p + k, with c a 
ciphertext, p an input plaintext, and k a secret key. 
Each data set consists of power traces and 16 
correlation traces taken from 250000 time points; 
each correlation trace obtained from each processing 
round. 
The first data set, called Data_No Countermea-
sures, was obtained from a smart card without any 
countermeasures. The second and third data sets, 
called Data_Few Dummy Cycles and Data_More 
DummyCycles, respectively, are data sets obtained 
with some dummy cycles. Dummy cycles are 
processes that are more or less identical to each other. 
Practically, the dummy cycles do nothing and they are 
irrelevant to the process carried out by the smart card. 
The dummy cycles are inserted randomly based on 
hardware random function, to make the smart card 
more secure. 
We apply the Gaussian curve fitting method to 
the 16 correlation traces obtained from the byte trace 
approach of each data set. The results from this step 
for each correlation trace are a list of all peaks found 
in the trace along with the peak properties and the 
score for each peak. Table 1 shows the result using 
one window size, i.e., 1250 samples, on the first 
correlation trace of the Data_NoCountermeasures.  
In Table 1, it is shown that there are 15 peaks 
found in the correlation trace. All the peak properties 
are normalized so that the values are between 0 and 1. 
The fifth peak is the highest scored one, with a score 
of 0.7073. We can observe that using the Gaussian 
curve fitting method, we can replace the original 
correlation trace with scores. 
 
Table 1: The peak properties and scores of the first 
correlation trace obtained from the byte trace approach of 
Data_NoCountermeasures with window size 1250 samples 
Peak 
Loca-
tion 
Rescaled 
Normalized 
score Height Area 
Inverse 
width 
  1 7 0.2211 0.2495 0.4795 0.0214 
 2 16.5 0.1922 0.1214 0.9495 0.0181 
 3 30.5 0.1924 0.3623 0.3251 0.0184 
 4 46 0.1869 0.1559 0.8307 0.0197 
 5 62.5 1.0000 1.0000 0.8697 0.7073 
 6 79.5 0.2183 0.2147 0.6266 0.0239 
 7 92 0.2286 0.2423 0.7204 0.0325 
 8 104.5 0.2055 0.2104 0.5424 0.0191 
 9 113.5 0.1975 0.1230 1.0000 0.0198 
 10 122.5 0.2184 0.2085 0.6832 0.0253 
 11 135 0.2175 0.2695 0.5075 0.0242 
 12 147.5 0.2116 0.1753 0.9528 0.0279 
 13 157.5 0.1797 0.1498 0.6917 0.0151 
 14 172 0.1742 0.3344 0.2591 0.0123 
 15 190.5 0.1829 0.2893 0.3517 0.0151 
 
After that we also apply the evaluation methods 
to determine average score distances and to decide 
whether the highest score peak is significant or not. In 
this section, we provide the evaluation method results 
on peak scores computed for four window sizes, i.e., 
[2200 1500 800 100] samples. The results are given in 
Table 2, 3, and 4. Each table contains average score 
distance, significant peak decisions, the location of the 
highest score peak, and the height of the highest score 
peak, for 16 correlation traces taken from each 
Data_NoCountermeasures, Data_FewDummyCycles, 
and Data_MoreDummyCycles. The significant peak 
decisions give values 0 and 1. The value 0 indicates 
that the highest score peak is not significant, and the 
value 1 indicates the opposite.  
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Table 2: The results of the evaluation methods on peak 
scores computed based on four window sizes, i.e., [2200 
1500 800 100] of Data_NoCountermeasures 
Correlation 
trace 
Average score 
distance 
Significant 
peak 
Peak 
location 
Peak 
height 
  0 0.9729 1 89639 0.5190 
 1 0.9567 1 90565 0.4114 
 2 0.9556 1 91583 0.4233 
 3 0.8246 1 92436 0.2592 
 4 0.8653 1 93547 0.2800 
 5 0.5932 1 94586 0.1558 
 6 0.5081 0 95879 0.1712 
 7 0.9366 1 43276 0.5813 
 8 0.9707 1 89606 0.5189 
 9 0.8723 1 90585 0.2915 
 10 0.8287 1 91981 0.2819 
 11 0.9404 1 92573 0.3531 
 12 0.7578 1 93548 0.2274 
 13 0.7975 1 94507 0.2327 
 14 0.6413 1 95513 0.2080 
 15 0.9351 1 96931 0.3913 
 
Table 3: The results of the evaluation methods on peak 
scores computed based on four window sizes, i.e., [2200 
1500 800 100] of Data_FewDummyCycles 
Correlation 
trace 
Average score 
distance 
Significant 
peak 
Peak 
location 
Peak 
height 
  0 0.6430 1 97915 0.1579 
 1 0.7275 1 98886 0.1858 
 2 0.3843 0 91428 0.1226 
 3 0.5103 0 101022 0.1654 
 4 0.4147 0 30352 0.1418 
 5 0.3066 0 103754 0.1206 
 6 0.2936 0 242664 0.1309 
 7 0.5546 0 56889 0.1702 
 8 0.5130 0 97915 0.1493 
 9 0.3032 0 225744 0.1344 
 10 0.6733 1 100026 0.1740 
 11 0.5690 0 101294 0.1493 
 12 0.6350 1 102099 0.1552 
 13 0.4200 0 182481 0.1337 
 14 0.4610 0 104363 0.1364 
 15 0.7368 1 105027 0.2041 
 
Table 2 shows that among all 16 correlation 
traces of Data_NoCountermeasures, only one correla-
tion trace does not have a significant peak. The other 
correlation traces have a signifiant peak with the 
average score distance generally higher than 0.80. We 
also observe that the peak locations in general are 
around the same point, which is the time point 
between 90000 and 97000. Based on the results, we 
conclude that the smart card is not secure.  
From Table 3, we observe that most of the 
significant peaks disappear because of the dummy 
cycles addition. It also shows that the average score 
distance of the highest score peaks found in the 
Data_FewDummyCycles are mostly greater than 0.50 
and most of them are not significant. The peak 
locations now are also not centralized in a certain time 
point range. This shows us that adding some dummy 
cycles improve the security of the smart card. 
 
Table 4: The results of the evaluation methods on peak 
scores computed based on four window sizes, i.e., [2200 
1500 800 100] of Data_MoreDummyCycles 
Correlation 
trace 
Average score 
distance 
Significant 
peak 
Peak 
location 
Peak 
height 
  0 0.3267 0 165057 0.1184 
 1 0.3334 0 22086 0.1189 
 2 0.4001 0 225990 0.1358 
 3 0.4148 0 220618 0.1273 
 4 0.3594 0 109355 0.1261 
 5 0.3282 0 74586 0.1371 
 6 0.5354 1 164374 0.1425 
 7 0.3141 0 179148 0.1250 
 8 0.3305 0 59876 0.1160 
 9 0.3379 0 93696 0.1303 
 10 0.5304 0 113245 0.1495 
 11 0.4730 0 96061 0.1437 
 12 0.4179 0 142481 0.1281 
 13 0.3600 0 112019 0.1311 
 14 0.3029 0 106447 0.1282 
 15 0.4706 0 82370 0.1355 
 
The data Data_MoreDummyCycles was obtain-
ned from the smart card with dummy cycles inserted 
in every 4 to 20 cycles. This means that the data 
contains more dummy cycles than the Data_Few 
DummyCycles. Consistent with this fact, the results 
on Table 4 show that now only one correlation trace 
has a significant peak with a rather low average score 
distance. This shows that, even though this counter-
measure setting does not make the smart card 
completely secure, it is more secure than the other 
settings.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We conclude that the Gaussian curve fitting 
method is able to give scores to each peak found in a 
correlation trace. The scores represent the original 
correlation trace. The average score distance is able to 
represent the peak significance by a number, while the 
cluster analysis method is able to represent the peak 
significance by showing to which cluster the highest 
peak score belongs to. Using the Gaussian curve 
fitting method, the subjective qualification of the peak 
significance can be objectified. Thus, better decisions 
can be taken by security experts. We also conclude 
that the Gaussian curve fitting method is able to show 
the influence of peak sizes, especially the width and 
height, to a significance of a particular peak. 
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